













Risks, and the Wealth Distribution
in a Heterogeneous Agent Model
by
Christiane Clemens and Maik Heinemann
University of Lüneburg




ISSN 18605580Credit Constraints, Idiosyncratic Risks, and the






Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Germany, Christiane.Clemens@ww.uni-magdeburg.de
University of Lunenburg, Germany, heinemann@uni-lueneburg.de
1Abstract
This paper examines the effects of credit market imperfections and idiosyn-
cratic risks on occupational choice, capital accumulation, as well as on the in-
come and wealth distribution in a two sector heterogeneous agent general equi-
librium model. Workers and rm owners are subject to idiosyncratic shocks.
Entrepreneurship is the riskier occupation. Compared to an economy with per-
fect capital markets, we nd for the case of serially correlated shocks that more
individuals choose the entrepreneurial profession in the presence of credit con-
straints, and that the uctuation between occupations increases too. Workers
and entrepreneurs with high individual productivity tend to remain in their
present occupation, whereas low productivity individuals are more likely to
switch between professions. Interestingly, these results reverse if we assume
iid shocks, thus indicating that the nature of the underlying shocks plays an
important role for the general equilibrium effects. In general, the likelihood of
entrepreneurship increases with individual wealth.
Keywords: DSGE model, wealth distribution, occupational choice, credit constraints
JELclassication: C68, D3 , D8, D9, G0, J241 Introduction
This paper examines the effects of credit marketimperfections and idiosyncratic risks
on occupational choice, capital accumulation, as well as on the income and wealth
distribution. Our analysis contributes to recent literature on dynamic stochastic
heterogeneous agent general equilibrium models concerned with risk and distribu-
tional dynamics, for instance, Quadrini (2000), Meh (2005), Bohá cek (2006) and
Cagetti and De Nardi (2006).
We develop a model which combines the features of an Aiyagari (1994)type
economy with occupational choice under risk à la Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979) and
Kanbur (1979a,b), and the twosector approach of Romer (1990), but without en-
dogenous growth. In each period of time, the riskaverse agents choose between
between two alternative occupations. They either set up an enterprise in the in-
termediate goods industry which is characterized by monopolistic competition. Or,
they supply their labor endowment to the production of a nal good in a perfectly
competitive market. Producers of the nal good use capital and labor inputs, and
differentiated varieties of the intermediate good. All households are subject to an
income risk. Managerial ability and productivity as a worker follow independent
random processes. Entrepreneurial activity is rewarded with a higher expected in-
come.1 Similar to Bewley (1977) and Lucas (1978), there is no aggregate risk.
The economic performance in the intermediate goods industry crucially depends
on two factors: uncertainty and credit constraints. Business owners face an rm
specic productivity shock, and there are no markets available for pooling the idio-
syncratic risks. Physical capital is the single input factor in the intermediate goods
industry. Entrepreneurs maximize their prots if their business operates at the opti-
mal rm size. For an individual wealth too small to maintain the optimal rm size,
the rmowner would want to borrow the remaining amount on the credit market,
where he might be subject to nancial constraints. If the entrepreneur is wealthy
enough, he operates his business at the protmaximizing level and supplies the rest
of his wealth to the capital market. To this end, our approach draws a simple picture
of the empirical result, stated by Heaton and Lucas (2000), that the entrepreneurial
households' business wealth on average constitutes a relevant fraction of their total
wealth. There is no further portfolio choice in our framework.
Capital accumulation plays a twofold role in the context outlined above: On
the one hand, it endows individuals with the wealth necessary to setup and op-
erate a rm. On the other hand, bufferstock saving provides a selfinsurance on
intertemporal markets against the nondiversiable income risk. Accordingly, we
nd that wealthier households are more likely to be members of the entrepreneurial
class than poorer ones and there is a marked concentration of wealth in the hands
1See also Clemens (2006a,b) and Clemens and Heinemann (2006) for entrepreneurial risktaking
in a general equilibrium context.
1of entrepreneurs which is consistent with recent empirical ndings (cf. Quadrini,
1999; Holtz-Eakin et al., 1994a). Upward mobility of entrepreneurs in our model
is primarily accumulation driven. The riskiness of entrepreneurial incomes looses
its importance for occupational choice once the household's income share generated
from prots declines relative to his capital income. Nevertheless, in accordance with
Hamilton (2000), many entrepreneursof our model enter and persist in business de-
spite the fact that they have lower initial earnings than average wage incomes.
We are especially interested in the question of how tightening the credit con-
straints affects the macroeconomic general equilibrium regarding the sectoral al-
location of capital and labor, factor prices, the income and wealth distribution,
occupational choice as well as the betweengroup mobility of households. Re-
garding empirical evidence, there seems to be a strong support for the hypoth-
esis that capital market imperfections are an impediment to entrepreneurship
even after controlling for entrepreneurial ability; see Evans and Leighton (1989),
Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994b), Blanchower and Oswald
(1998), Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002), as well as Desai et al. (2003).
Gentry and Hubbard (2004) point out that external nancing has important im-
plications for individual investment and saving. This evidence is challenged by
Hurst and Lusardi (2004), who nd that the likelihood of entering entrepreneur-
ship relative to initial wealth is at over a large range of the wealth distribution
and increasing only for higher wealth levels of workers. Our model is capable of
reproducing theses ndings for the case of uncorrelated shocks.
The general equilibrium nature of our approach generates surprising and almost
counterintuitive results regarding the impact of credit constraints on occupational
choice under risk. If the idiosyncratic risks follow autoregressive processes, more
households choose the entrepreneurial profession in the constrained compared to
the unconstrained economy which is accompanied by a reduction in the average rm
size, both results contradicting theoretical ndings by Cagetti and De Nardi (2006).
Wealth inequality does not necessarily decline if we relax borrowing constraints.
Additionally, we observe an increase in betweengroup mobility, if credit constraints
become more binding. Workers and entrepreneurs with high individual productivity
tend to remain in their present occupation, whereas low productivity individuals are
more likely to switch between professions.
These results reverse completely, if we consider iid shocks to individual produc-
tivity. In this case, credit constraints actually are an impediment to entrepreneurship.
Only the wealthy workers tend to switch between occupations and betweengroup
mobility drops down sharply for an increase in the tightness of credit constraints.
Independent of the persistence of the underlying shocks, the likelihood of entre-
preneurship increases in individual wealth. Regarding the functional distribution
of income, we nd that credit constraints have a redistributive effect by raising the
prot income share at the cost of capital incomes. The results indicate that the
2stochastic nature of the underlying idiosyncratic shocks also plays an important role
for the explanation of the general equilibrium effects of nancial constraints and
credit market imperfections.
Recent contributions in this area of research suffer from several shortcomings
which our approach aims to overcome. In Quadrini (2000), occupational choice
and the level of entrepreneurship is (more or less) entirely governed by the under-
lying productivity shocks. Bohá cek (2006) discusses a onesector economy which
does not allow for factor movements between industries and therefore neglects fac-
tor substitution. In our model, producers of the intermediate and the nal good
are subject to competition, especially with respect to capital demand. Our approach
does not have xed entry costs (in terms of discrete investment projects) of en-
trepreneurship as in Ghatak et al. (2001) or Cagetti and De Nardi (2006). Instead,
we have an endogenously determined optimal rm size and no discontinuities in
individual credit demand. Occupational choice, entrepreneurial activity and per-
formance crucially depend on monopoly prots, market shares and relative factor
scarcity in the two sectors of production. Also different to Cagetti and De Nardi
(2006), the entrepreneurs of our economy are essential for aggregate output. As
will become obvious below, the interdependence of sectors is important for the gen-
eral equilibrium results on occupational choice, betweengroup mobility and the
income and wealth distribution, and contribute to the explanation of the sometimes
counterintuitive effects of borrowing constraints as outlined above.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 develops the twosector model. We
describe the equilibrium associated with a stationary earnings and wealth distribu-
tion in Section 3 and present benchmark results on static efciency in the perfect
riskpooling economy. Since the formal structure of the model does not allow for an-
alytical solutions, we perform numerical simulations of a calibrated model in order
to examine the general equilibrium effects of an increase in the tightness of credit
constraints. Section 4 gives information on the calibration procedure and discusses
the simulation results. Section 5 concludes. Technical details are relegated to the
Appendix.
2 The Model
We consider a neoclassical growth model with two sectors of production. The nal
goods industry consists of a large number of perfectly competitive rms who hire
capital and labor services and use an intermediate good in order to produce a homo-
geneous output which can be consumed or invested respectively. The intermediate
good is produced under the regime of monopolistic competition. Each rm in the in-
termediate goods industry is owned and managed by an entrepreneur. Both sectors
of production are essential.
3Market activity in the intermediate goods industry is constrained. In order to
run the business at the protmaximizing rm size, entrepreneurs either possess
sufcient wealth of their own, or they need to compensate for their lack of equity by
borrowing on the credit market, where they might be subject to credit constraints. In
the latter case, remaining in the entrepreneurial profession might not prove worth-
while.
The economy is populated by a continuum [0;1] innitelylived households, each
endowed with one unit of labor. In each period of time, individuals decide whether
to become producers of the intermediate good or to supply their labor services to
the production of the nal good. Labor efciency as well as entrepreneurial produc-
tivity are idiosyncratic random variables. Regarding the associated income risk, we
assume that wage incomes are less risky than prot incomes. There is no aggregate
risk.
With respect to the timing of events, we assume that individual occupational
choice takes place behind a veil of ignorance regarding the realization of the idio-
syncratic shock. Once the draw of nature has occurred, entrepreneurs as well as
workers in the nal goods sector know their individual productivity. Those monop-
olists who now discover their own wealth being too low to operate at the optimal
rms size, will express their capital demand on the credit market, probably become
subject to creditconstraints, and then start production. After labor and prot in-
come is realized, the households decide on how much to consume and to invest.
There is no capital income risk.
Final goods sector The representative rm of the nal goods sector produces a
homogeneous goodY using capital KF and varieties of an intermediate good x(i);i 2
[0;l] as inputs. Production in this sector takes place under perfect competition and









x(i)a di ; 0 < a < 1; 0 < g < 1; A > 0 : (1)
Each type of intermediate good employed in the production of the nal good is
identied with one monopolistic producer in the intermediate goods sector. Con-
sequently, the number of different types is identical with the population share of
entrepreneurs in the population. The number of entrepreneurs is determined en-
dogenously through occupational choices of the agents, which will be described
below. Additiveseparability of (1) in intermediate goods ensures that the marginal
product of input i is independent of the quantity employed of i0 6= i. Intermediate
goods are close but not perfect substitutes in production.
2All macroeconomic variables are timedependent. For notational convenience, we will drop the
explicit timenotation unless necessary.





p(i)x(i) di ; (2)
where p(i) denotes the price of intermediate good i. We further assume physical
capital to depreciate over time at the constant rate d, such that the interest factor
is given by R = 1+r d. Optimization yields the prot maximizing factor demands

















The monopolistic producer of intermediate good x(i) faces the isoelastic demand
function (5), the direct price elasticity of demand given by  1=(1 a). Condition
(4) describes aggregate labor demand in efciency units. Equation (3) is the nal
good sector demand for capital services.
Production in the intermediate goods sector The intermediate goods sector consists
of the population fraction l of entrepreneurs who selfemploy their labor endow-
ment by operating a monopolistic rm. Each rm produces a single variety i of the
differentiated intermediate good by using capital services according to the identical
constant returns to scale technology of the form
x(i) = Bq(i)ek(i) ; B > 0 : (6)
Firms differ with respect to the realization of an idiosyncratic productivity shock
q(i)e which is assumed to be nondiversiable and uncorrelated across rms. We
will give a more detailed description of the distributional properties of this shock
below. Entrepreneurs hire capital after the draw of nature has occurred. The rm
problem essentially is a static one. Under perfect competition of the capital market,
the producer treats the rental rate to capital as exogenously given and maximizes
his prot
p(i) = p(k(i);q(i)e) = p(i)x(i) (r+d)k(i) : (7)
Utilizing the demand function for intermediate good typei, (5), and the pro-
duction technology (6), the optimal rm decision can be expressed in terms of the









5Because capital demand takes place after the draw of nature has occurred, there
is no individual capital risk and no underemployment of input factors. The opti-
mal rm size increases with random individual productivity q(i)e, such that more
productive business owners demand more capital on the capital market. Labor in-
put in efciency units determines the optimal rm size by means of the demand
function for intermediate good type i. Aggregate employment is a weighted aver-
age and depends on the size of the labor force 1 l, i.e. the population fraction of
agents choosing the occupation of a worker, and the idiosyncratic shock on labor
productivity qw. The larger the labor force 1 l, the higherceteris paribuswill
be aggregate employment L. This goes along with fewer monopolists in the inter-
mediate goods industry, less competition, and a larger market share, as measured
by the optimal rm size.
Capital market and credit constraints Let k(i) =a(i)+b(i) be the rm size an entre-
preneur is able to operate at from own wealth and borrowed resources. This oper-
ating capital k(i) is not necessarily equal to the optimal rm size k(i) determined
in (8). An entrepreneur with individual wealth a(i) lower than k(i) would want to
borrow the amount k(i)  a(i). We assume that credit markets are imperfect with
respect to lenders not being able to enforce loanrepayment due to limited commit-
ment of borrowers (cf. Banerjee and Newman, 1993). In case of k(i) <k(i) the rm
faces a borrowing constraint. Without explicitly stating an incentivecompatibility
constraint, we assume that the borrowing amount is limited such that the maximum
possible loan is proportional to the borrowers individual wealth a(i). Let fa(i), f>0,
denote this upper limit to individual loans. The parameter f can be interpreted as
indirectly measuring the extent to which a lender can use the borrower's wealth
and prot income as collateral, and therefore is able to enforce his claim, such that
credit default does not occur in equilibrium. Credit constraints become less tight
with rising f and vanish for large f. The limiting cases consequently reect the two
cases of either complete enforceability (f ! ¥) or no enforceability (f = 0), such
that in the rst case the borrower is considered solvent, whereas in the second one
he is not.
Summing up, the operating rm size k(i) of entrepreneuri with productivity q(i)e
and wealth a(i) can be written as:
k(i) = k(q(i)e;a(i)) = min[a(i);k(i)]+min[fa(i);k(i)  min[a(i);k(i)]] : (9)
The rst term on the RHS of (9) reects the size of a rm which does not have
or does not need any access to the credit market and simply rests with its own
wealth. The second term describes the amount an entrepreneur with wealth a(i)
will actually borrow. The subsequent numerical analysis will show that the high
productivity entrepreneurs are more likely subject to creditconstraints than the
6lowproductivity ones, because the optimal rm size and henceforth the capital
demand are positively correlated with the productivity shock.
An entrepreneur whose individual wealth exceeds the wealth level needed to
operate is business at the optimal rm size will lend the amount a(i) k(i) on the
capital market at the equilibrium interest rate. There is no difference between bor-
rowing and lending rates. The supply side of the capital market altogther consists
of those entrepreneurs whose wealth exceeds their individual optimal rm size and
of workers, who supply their savings. On the demand side we have the credit
constrained entrepreneurs and rms from the nal goods industry. From this fol-
lows immediately that the size of the intermediate goods industry relative to the
nal goods sector essentially depends on occupational choice and individual wealth
accumulation, both determined endogenously in equilibrium.
Idiosyncratic risks In each period of time, workers are endowed with one unit of
raw labor and are subject to an idiosyncratic shock qw affecting labor supply in
efciency units, and exposing each of them to an uninsurable income risk. For
simplicity, we assume that labor productivity qw evolves according to a rstorder
Markov process with j=1;:::;m states, and qw;j >0. The transition matrix associated
with the Markov process is Pw.
Entrepreneurial productivity qe also evolves according to a rstorder Markov
process with j = 1;:::;m different states qe;1;:::;qe;m; qe;j > 0, and transition proba-
bility Pe. Since agents can either be workers or entrepreneurs, it is possible to iden-
tify the occupational status s(j) of an agent with his productivity in the respective









We assume worker productivities to be more evenly distributed than managerial
skills, such that prot incomes in general are more risky than wage incomes. As is
wellknown from the literature, entrepreneurs on average are compensated with a
positive income differential (aka `risk premium') for bearing the production risk.
By modeling two distinct random processes for workers and entrepreneurs, we
take into account that the two professions demand different skills, for instance man-
agerial ability. For this reason, we assume the processes qw and qe to be uncorrelated.
The conditional expectation of individual productivity as an entrepreneur is in-
dependent of the labor productivity, when being a worker. A high productivity as
a worker in the present does not necessarily indicate an equivalently high future
productivity as an entrepreneur, if the individual should decide to switch between
occupations in the next period. The associated probabilities are summarized in a
mm transition matrices Ph;h0 describing the transition from productivity state qh;j
to state qh;j0 for j; j0 = 1;:::;m, h = e;w and h 6= h0.
7We consider two different specications regarding the Markov processes for en-
trepreneurial and worker productivity.3 The shocks of the rst setting are assumed
to be iid, i.e. serially uncorrelated, such that an individual cannot infer from his
present productivity how his future productivity in the same occupation will be. We
then relax this assumption and allow for serial correlation of productivities, such
that currently highly productive workers and entrepreneurs are more likely to be
highly productive in the future.4
Intertemporal decisionand occupationalchoice Each household has preferencesover





btU[ct(i)] 0 < b < 1 :
E0 is the expectation operator conditional on information at date 0 and b is the
discount factor. Individuals are assumed to be identical with respect to their pref-








for r > 0;r 6= 1
lnc(i) for r = 1 ;
where r denotes the Arrow/Pratt measure of relative risk aversion.
In each period, the single household is endowed with a unit of raw labor and
in addition to his intertemporal decisionmakes a choice on his future occupation,
which is either to become a selfemployed producer of an intermediate good in
the monopolistically competitive market or to supply his labor services in efciency
units inelastically to the production of the nal good. Let V w(a(i);s(j)w) denote the
optimal value function of an agent currently being a worker with wealth a(i), who is
in productivity state s(j)w. If he decides to remain a worker, his productivity evolves
according to the transition matrix Pw of the underlying Markov process with states
qw;1;:::;qw;m. If, instead, he decides to become an entrepreneur in the following
period, his next period productivity q0
e is determined by the transition matrix Pw;e.
3As the subsequential analysis will show, the dynamic properties of the underlying Markov pro-
cesses turn out to be crucial for the observed betweengroup mobility.
4In our numerical simulations we follow Tauchen (1986) and build the discrete Markov processes
for productivities such as to approximate AR(1) processes of the general form
lnq0
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, such that the unconditional expectation is given by E[qh] = 1 for h = e;w.
8The associated maximized value function for a typical individual currently being






















s.t. a(i)0 = (1+r)a(i)+s(j)ww c(i) :
(10)
x is a boolean variable which takes on the values 0 or 1, depending on whether or not
the agent decides to switch between occupations. r and w denote the equilibrium
returns to capital and labor in efciency units, which are constant over time for
a stationary distribution of wealth and occupational statuses across agents. The
optimal decision associated with the problem (10) is described by the two decision
rules for individual asset holdings a(i)0
w = aw(a(i); s(j)w) and the future professional
state x0
w = xw(a(i); s(j)w).
Let Ve(a(i);s(j)e) denote the maximized value function of an entrepreneur with
wealth a(i) in productivity state s(j)e, who faces a decision problem similar to those
of a worker. If he decides to remain an entrepreneur, his productivity evolves ac-
cording to the transition matrix Pe of the underlying Markov process with states
s(j)e = qe;1;:::;qe;m. If, instead, he decides to switch between occupations by be-
coming a worker in the next period, his future productivity q0
w is determined by the
transition matrix Pe;w. With k(s(j)e) denoting the optimal rm size, the intertempo-



























Again, x is a booleanvariable, indicating the agent's decision on leavingor remaining
in his contemporaneous occupational status. The optimal decision associated with
the problem (11) is described by the two decision rules for individual asset holdings
a(i)0
e = ae(a(i); s(j)e) and the future professional state x0
e = xe(a(i); s(j)e).
In general, our model displays the same characteristics regarding individual sav-
ings and wealth accumulation under risk as, for instance, discussed in Aiyagari













 ae;2  aw;1  ae;1  aw;2
Figure 1: Policy functions in the unconstrained economy (iid shocks)
(1994) or Huggett (1996). Similar to Quadrini (2000) we additionally consider
occupational choice. The shocks to worker and entrepreneurial productivity gen-
erate an income risk to which the households respond with precautionary saving.
According to Leland (1968), decreasing absolute risk aversion is a necessary and
sufcient condition to generate motives for precautionary savings in the presence
of income risk, which is satised here for any coefcient of relative risk aversion of
r > 0. In terms of Sandmo (1970) there is only an income but no capital risk in
our model, such that the share of risky incomes in total household income declines
with growing wealth. Accordingly, the importance of risky prots providing negative
incentives for entrepreneurship fades for high wealth levels.
Figure 1 illustrates the individual occupational choice problem. It shows pol-
icy functions aw(a(i); s(j)w) and ae(a(i); s(j)e) for the simplied case of uncon-
strained entrepreneurs and serially uncorrelated shocks based on the numerically
specied model of section 4. The corresponding decision rules xw(a(i);s(j)w) and
xe(a(i); s(j)e) can be used to determine the next period critical wealth level  a0 where
a household currently in productivity state s(j) decides to change his occupational
status. In the special case of uncorrelated productivity shocks, this critical wealth
level is identical over all productivity states and occupational statuses. For illus-
trative purposes we only show the policy functions for two (out of ve) states, the
subscripts 1;2 denoting the low and high productivity states respectively.
10An agent, who currently is a worker with low productivity qw;1 with wealth hold-
ings below  aw;1, will never become an entrepreneur because his next period wealth
will never exceed the critical level  a0. In contrast to this, a worker currently in
productivity state qw;2 with wealth holdings below  aw;2 eventually becomes an en-
trepreneur because his wealth increases over time.
The line of argument is similar for households who currently are entrepreneurs.
An individual, who is productivity state qe;2 with wealth holdings above  ae;2, remains
an entrepreneurin the next period, because his wealth holdings will never fall below
the critical level  a0. Contrary, an entrepreneur in the current productivity state qe;1
with wealth holdings below  ae;1 eventually becomes a worker, because his wealth
will decrease over time.
The major consequence of credit market imperfections for occupational choice
is that they shift the critical level of next period's wealth upwards. This happens
only if credit restrictions become actually binding. If the next period critical wealth
level even exceeds the optimal (unconstrained) rm size of an entrepreneurwith the
highest productivity, no business owner will ever become credit constrained. Recall
at this point that the rm size in the intermediate goods industry is endogenously
determined by factor prices and the producers' market shares, the latter crucially
depending on the number of rms in the market. If constraints become binding
they have an aggravating effect on market dynamics in the case of uncorrelated
shocks. Firms are forced to exit the market. The individual market share falling
to the remaining producers grows. This leads to an increase in individual rm size
and, in turn, exposes more entrepreneurs to credit constraints.
In the calibrated model underlying Figure 1, the optimal rm size of a producer
with the highest productivity is by sixteen times larger than the critical wealth level
making agents change their profession and by twelve times larger than equilibrium
average wealth holdings. In this case less than 0:5% of the whole population own
sufcient wealth not to demand any credit and business owners heavily rely on
credit market access in order to operate their rms at the optimal rm size.5
Summarizing, our model allows us to predict the betweenclass mobility of
agents in the case of uncorrelated shocks. Highly productive entrepreneurs remain
in their occupational status, whereas lowproductivity entrepreneurs quit and be-
come workers. The reverse is true for workers. Here lowproductivity households
remain in their occupational status, whereas the highly productive workers decide
to take their chances with entrepreneurship. As will become obvious below, the
persistence of shocks leads to completely different and more complicated mobility
patterns which are more difcult to predict, because not only individual wealth but
also the time path of individual productivity is important for occupational choice.
5The equilibrium optimal rm size in the highest productivity state is k = 6:072, while the critical
level of next period's wealth is given by  a0 = 0:3581. Average wealth holdings are reported in Table 2.
113 Stationary General Equilibrium
A general equilibrium is an allocation, where the equilibrium prices generate a dis-
tribution of wealth and occupational statuses across agents which is consistent with
these prices given the exogenous process for the idiosyncratic shocks and the agents'
optimal decision rules.
Let KF, L and x(i)D denote the demands of capital, effective labor and interme-
diate goods in the nal goods sector. We obtain aggregate labor supply by summing
up individual labor supplies in efciency units over the population fraction 1 l of
workers. Let, furthermore, qj; j = 1;:::;m denote the relative frequencies of states
qw;j in the equilibrium distribution of labor productivities. The stationary recursive
equilibrium is a set of value functions V w(a;sw), Ve(a;se), decision rules aw(a; sw),
xw(a; sw) and ae(a; se), xe(a; se), prices w; r; p and a distribution l;1 l of households
across occupations such that:
(i) the decision rules aw(a; sw), xw(a; sw) and ae(a; se), xe(a; se) solve the workers'
and entrepreneurs' problems (10) and (11) at prices w; r; p,
(ii) the aggregate demands of consumption, labor, capital and intermediate goods
are the aggregationof individual demands and markets clearat constant prices














qjqw;j di = L
x(i)S = x(i)D ;
(iii) the stationary distribution G(l;a;Pe;Pw;Pe;w;Pw;e) of agents across individual
wealth holdings, occupational statuses and associated productivities is the
xed point of the law of motion which is consistent with the individual de-
cision rules and equilibrium prices. The distribution l;1 l of agents across
occupations is timeinvariant.
The decision rules for workers, aw(a; sw), xw(a; sw), and entrepreneurs, ae(a; se),
xe(a; se), together with the stochastic processes for individual labor productivity and
entrepreneurial productivity, determine the stationary distribution G at equilibrium
prices w;r. The stationary distribution G governs the population share of entrepren-
eurs (i.e. the mass of rms in the intermediate goods sector), the efciency units
of labor supplied by workers, capital demand of the intermediate goods sector, and
12the aggregate capital supply, the latter equaling the mean of individual wealth hold-
ings. Once the population share of entrepreneurs l is derived, this together with
the stationary distribution of entrepreneurial productivities determines the supply
of intermediate goods.
Equilibrium factor income shares In what follows, it will be convenient to have
some information on the functional distribution of income. Households derive in-
come from three sources: labor income, capital income and monopolistic prots.
The two technology parameters a and g entirely determine the division of aggre-
gate income among the three income sources in the absence of credit constraints
on entrepreneurial activity. In this case, each business in the intermediate goods
sector operates at its optimal rm size (8). The factors of production are payed
according to their marginal product. Eq. (1) immediately implies the labor income
share (1 a)(1 g) and the capital income share (1 a)g. The remaining income
share a accrues to incomes generated in the intermediate goods sector, namely en-
trepreneurial prots and capital income. Since the direct price elasticity of demand
is given by  1=(1 a), the prot income share equals a(1 a). The residual a2 then
is the capital income share of capital employed in the production of intermediate
goods, such that altogether the capital income share of the economy amounts to
(1 a)g+a2.
Static efciency in a riskpooling economy The underlying model displays three
types of inefciencies. Monopolistic competition shifts rents towards the producers
of the intermediate good. The presence of risk distorts the decisions of riskaverse
household, and, nally, producers are credit constrained. We now briey discuss the
conditions for an efcient allocation implemented by a social planner, who allocates
resources to sectoral production and individuals across occupations in order to max-
imize aggregate income. If aggregate income then is distributed uniformly among
households, this is equivalent to an efcient allocation in a perfect riskpooling
economy. The analysis allows us to confront the subsequent calibration results from
the decentralized economy with a reference allocation. For illustrative purposes, we
conne our analysis two a simple 2state setting. The productivity shocks are iid.
Let qw;1, qw;2, with qw;2 > qw;1, denote the two states of labor productivity, with asso-
ciated probabilities qw;1 qw. Let, accordingly, qe;1 ,qe;2, with qe;2 > qe;1, denote the
two states for entrepreneurial productivity, with associated probabilities qe;1 qe,
and output quantities of the intermediate good x1 and x2, the latter resulting as:
x1 = qe;1k1 ; x2 = qe;2k2 ;
where k1 and k2 denote the capital stocks allocated to entrepreneurs in state qe;1 and
qe;2 respectively. With l denoting the population share of entrepreneurs, aggregate

















The population share of workers equals 1 l. Aggregate labor supply L in efciency
units is given by:
L = (1 l) [qwqw;1 +(1 qw)qw;2]  (1 l) ¯ L
Aggregate output can be derived as:





where F(KF; L) is homogeneous of degree 1 a.
Static efciency demands that l, KF, k1 and k2 are chosen such as to maximize
Y subject to the the resource constraint KF +l[qek1 +(1 qe)k2]  K, where K de-
notes the aggregate capital stock. With µ as the Lagrange multiplier, the necessary
conditions for an efcient allocation are:


















From the latter two conditions follows the optimal allocation of capital over rms






Using this in the derivative with respect to KF and in the aggregate resource con-
straint, and combining both equations yields the optimal share of capital input in






























If we set the two technologyparameter such as to yield realistic factor incomeshares,
which is a =0:3 and g =0:1, about one fth of the aggregate capital stock should be
alloted to the nal goods sector. Regarding the sectoral allocation of households we
get a value of l=(1 l) = 1:1, stating that less workers are employed in the nal
goods production than we have business owners in the intermediate goods industry.
144 Model Calibration and Numerical Results
The economy is calibrated to match empirical evidence regarding the factor income
shares and the households' preferences with respect to risk aversion and time pref-
erence. We focus on three benchmark models, the baseline model being the one
without credit constraints (f = ¥). This is contrasted with (i) the case where the
lower bound for the equityratio is one half of the operating capital (f= 1), and (ii)
with perfect constraints (f =0), which is the case of rms in the intermediate goods
industry having no access to the capital market.
The rst aspect we are interested in is whether our model is able to replicate
empirical evidence on wealth distributions. We then examine how the presence of
credit constraints affects the key macroeconomic variables, such as aggregate out-
put, factor prices and factor income shares as well as individual incomes, household
wealth and the degree of inequality, the latter measured by the Gini coefcient.
We then analyze mobility between occupations and nally relate individual wealth
levels to the probability of becoming an entrepreneur by providing the associated
likelihood functions.
Numerical specication The baseline model is a model of perfect capital markets,
such that credit constraints never become binding. Recalling the results from above
on the functional distribution of income, the parameterization of the baseline model,
as given in Table 1, is chosen in accordance with empirically observed income shares
and plausible estimates for the coefcient of relative risk aversion and the rate
of time preference (Mehra and Prescott, 1985; Obstfeld, 1994; King and Rebelo,
1999). The labor income share in this setting equals 0:63, the capital share is 0:16
and the prot income share amounts to 0:21. We use B as a scaling factor for entre-
preneurial productivity.
Table 1: Parameters of the baseline model
a g d b r f A B
0.3 0.1 0.06 0.95 2.0 ¥ 1.0 10.0
The random processes of entrepreneurial and worker productivity are approxi-
mated by a vestate Markov chain. The numerical values of the vestate processes
chosen for qw and qe respectively are:
qw =





0:0036073 0:0342184 0:3246524 3:08022 29:2243
 : (14)
15The transition matrices for individuals who decide to switch occupations are de-
rived from the stationary distributions of the respective Markov processes. The prob-
ability for a worker of ending up in a specic state of entrepreneurial productivity
qe;1;:::;qe;m is given by the stationary (unconditional) probabilities for reaching this
state. The numerical specication is chosen such as to generate a standard deviation
of sw =0:2 of labor productivity which is close to Aiyagari (1994) and a much higher
standard deviation of se = 1:5 for entrepreneurial risk. We assume the productivity
shock affecting workers to be more evenly distributed than the productivity shock
affecting entrepreneurs. For the case of correlated shocks, the underlying random
process of worker productivity has a serial correlation of rw = 0:6. Regarding entre-
preneurs, we have re = 0:8, by this assuming a slightly larger degree of persistence.
Tables 2(a) and 2(b) in Appendix A summarize the transition probabilities and
the associated stationary distributions for transition between professions for the two
cases of autocorrelated and uncorrelated shocks.
Calibration results For the case f ! ¥, Figures 2 and 3 show the stationary distri-
bution of wealth (a) for the economy as a whole and (b) differentiated with respect
to workers and entrepreneurs for the two types of the underlying shocks. In gen-
eral, our model produces results similar to those found in the literature on hetero-
geneous agent models with entrepreneurial activity with respect to the distribution
of wealth across all agents (cf. Quadrini, 1999, 2000). If we take a differentiated
look at occupational statuses, we see that workers are more concentrated at lower
wealth levels, and there exists a signicant mass of wealthy entrepreneurs but also
a comparably large share of poorer ones. This is in line with empirical ndings by
Gentry and Hubbard (2004); Hamilton (2000) as well as with related theoretical
contributions (cf. Bohá cek, 2006; Cagetti and De Nardi, 2006).
Comparing Figure 2(b) to Figure 3(b) makes obvious how important the nature
of the underlying shocks is for the betweengroup equilibrium wealth distribution.
Although the aggregate wealth distributions roughly are of similar shape, there are
striking differences, when it comes to the distribution of wealth in the two occupa-
tional classes.
If the shocks are serially uncorrelated, we observe a perfectly segregated econ-
omy where workers possess little wealth and all rich households are entrepreneurs.
The picture is different if shocks are serially correlated. Here, the membership in
wealth classes is not entirely related to the occupational status. We observe rich
workers as well as poor entrepreneurs, although workers are more concentrated at
lower wealth levels.
Uncorrelated shocks Table 2 summarizes the results for the macroeconomic key
variables in the case of iid shocks. As the economic intuition would suggest, we
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eurs
Figure 2: Wealth distribution in the unconstrained economy  iid shocks
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(b) PDF of wealth: workers and entrepren-
eurs
Figure 3: Wealth distribution in the unconstrained economy  correlated shocks
observe a continuously declining population share of entrepreneurs, when access to
the capital market becomes more and more limited. At this point it is important to
notice that the presence of credit constraints not necessarily means that only those
agents, who have sufcient own wealth to operate their business at the optimal rm
size k, choose to become an entrepreneur. These are the only rms which actually
maximize their prots, whereas the creditconstrained entrepreneurs are forced to
operate at a suboptimally small business size. Consequently, the average rm size
in the intermediate goods industry decreases. However, as more agents decide to
become workers, the average prots of those remaining in the industry increase.
17Table 2: Simulations results  iid shocks
Tightness of credit constraints
f ! ¥ f = 1 f = 0
share of entrepreneurs (%) 24.48 24.36 24.00
? rm size total 1.127 1.060 0.979
? credit rationing total 0 0.133 0.385
? prots total 0.277 0.278 0.282
nal Y 0.323 0.314 0.299
goods KF (%) 43.73 45.87 48.92
sector KF 0.214 0.219 0.225
LF 0.758 0.759 0.763
factor w 0.268 0.261 0.247
prices r 0.045 0.041 0.033
w=(r+d) 2.544 2.569 2.654
factor labor 63.00 63.00 63.00
income capital 16.00 15.41 14.31
shares prots 21.00 21.58 22.69
? wealth total 0.490 0.477 0.460
workers 0.162 0.163 0.116
entrepreneurs 1.502 1.453 1.550
? income workers 0.268 0.278 0.258
entrepreneurs 0.436 0.426 0.426
risk premium 0.028 0.063 0.140
wealth total 0.636 0.625 0.677
inequality workers 0.324 0.360 0.414
(Gini) entrepreneurs 0.379 0.309 0.246
If there is only limited or no capital demand from the intermediate goods indus-
try, more capital is employed in the nal goods sector. With diminishing marginal re-
turns, the equilibrium interest rate r and accordingly the factor price for capital r+d
decline in both sectors of the economy. Recalling that entrepreneurial households
receive income from two sources, prots and capital incomes, the income share re-
ecting the user costs of capital declines for any given level of individual wealth,
whereas the prot income share rises, which explains the above mentioned posi-
tive effect of credit constraints on average entrepreneurial prots. Altogether, we
observe a shift in the functional income distribution from capital to prot incomes.
Wages as well as wage incomes decline in the presence of credit constraints. This
result follows immediately from marginal productivity theory, because the popula-
tion share of workers increases with less business owners remaining in the interme-
diate goods industry, also indicating that the average premium on entrepreneurial
activity grows; in our calibrated model even by the factor ve.
18Aggregate output declines too if the tightness of credit constraints increases. The
larger amounts of capital and labor employed (at decreasing marginal productivity)
in the production of the nal good do not compensate for the output loss associated
with a decline in the supply of intermediate goods. This permanent loss in aggregate
income is also reected in lower average wealth holdings. Overall wealth inequality
increases with more constrained access to the capital market. With respect to the
withingroup wealth distribution, we nd that wealth becomes more unevenly dis-
tributed among workers, whereas wealth inequality among entrepreneurs declines.6
Table 3 summarizes our results on betweengroup mobility in a stationary equi-
librium.7 Irrespective of the degree to which credit constraints are binding, we nd
that switches between occupational statuses can only be observed for the highly
productive workers, earning the highest wages, and the lowproductivity entre-
preneurs, earning the lowest prot incomes. Low and average productivity work-
ers as well as the highly productive entrepreneurs never change their occupation.
These results are in accordance with the economic intuition that earnings advan-
tages translate into higher individual wealth, the latter being an important determi-
nant of entrepreneurship, especially in the presence of credit constraints.
However, even in the unconstrained economy, only about 14% of those workers
with highest current productivity actually decide to switch between occupations.
This gure drops down to 2% in the case of perfect constraints. Related to the
entire population, betweengroup mobility is steadily declining from around 2.5%
in the unconstrained to 0.4% in the perfectly constrained economy, and altogether
takes place at a very low scale. These numbers are far too low to match empirical
ndings. Evans (1987) reports entry and exit rates around 4:5%. Serially correlated
shocks increase mobility considerably, even above the reported empirical values, as
will become obvious below. From this we conclude that persistence of shocks is an
important determinant of betweengroup mobility.
The critical wealth level, where an agent decides to change his occupation, is
inversely related to the productivity shock. Generally, we can say that the presence
of credit constraints dampens mobility between occupations, and that the threshold
wealth levels at which households are willing to change their next period occupation
rise for each given state of productivity.
Autocorrelated shocks Table 4 summarizes the results for the three settings f ! ¥,
f = 1, and f = 0 with respect to the macroeconomic key variables for the case of
serially correlated shocks. The most striking result is that the population share of
entrepreneurs increases if credit constraints become more binding. Although the
6Notice, that the Gini coefcient does not allow for a simple decomposition of total inequality into
inequality within and between subgroups.
7The withingroup mobility can be inferred from the limiting distribution given in Table 2(a) in
the Appendix.
19Table 3: Mobility over occupational statuses  iid shocks
Tightness of credit constraints
f ! ¥ f = 1 f = 0
state total change acrit
? total change acrit
? total change acrit
?
qw;1 0.0092 0 0.486 0.0092 0 0.533 0.0093 0 0.532
qw;2 0.1619 0 0.438 0.1622 0 0.486 0.1629 0 0.486
workers qw;3 0.4130 0 0.372 0.4136 0 0.426 0.4156 0 0.426
qw;4 0.1619 0.0202 0.284 0.2622 0.0116 0.337 0.1629 0.0031 0.344
qw;5 0.0092 0.0045 0.164 0.0092 0.0028 0.221 0.0093 0.0010 0.232
total 0.7552 0.0247 0.7564 0.0144 0.7600 0.0041
qe;1 0.0030 0.0006 0.593 0.0030 0.0005 0.643 0.0029 0.0001 0.625
qe;2 0.0525 0.0096 0.546 0.0522 0.0066 0.591 0.0515 0.0024 0.575
entre- qe;3 0.1338 0.0145 0.415 0.1332 0.0073 0.455 0.1312 0.0016 0.451
preneurs qe;4 0.0525 0 0.078 0.0522 0 0.232 0.0515 0 0.269
qe;5 0.0030 0  0.0030 0 0.057 0.0029 0 0.086
total 0.2448 0.0247 0.2436 0.0144 0.2400 0.0041
? acrit is the level of wealth at which an agent changes his occupational status. a denotes
the minimum level of individual wealth, '' means that a switches in the occupational status
never occurs.
effect in total is quantitatively small, the population share increasing by less than
one and a half percentage point, it is obvious that credit constraints do not turn out
an impediment to entrepreneurship as one might have expected from the previous
analysis.
This somewhat counterintuitive result can be traced back to the general equi-
librium nature of our approach. Credit constraints are only one out of several de-
terminants of occupational choice. Entrepreneurs compete with rms from the nal
goods industry for capital and the expected income premium on entrepreneurial
prots also affects the households' decisions. Besides these factors it is important to
bear in mind that households continuously decide between two lotteries and possess
(at least subjective) knowledge regarding the stochastic properties of the underlying
shocks.
In the case of serially correlated shocks, a lowproductivity worker is aware of
the fact that being also lowly productive in the future is a more probable outcome
than otherwise. Consequently he might be inclined to take his chances with entre-
preneurship, knowing that his current productivity as a worker is not related to his
future productivity as a business owner.8
One major effect, shown in Table 4, is that average prots generated from entre-
preneurial activity are smaller if business owners are barred from the capital market
8Relaxing this assumption is left for future research.
20Table 4: Simulation results  autocorrelated shocks
Tightness of credit constraints
f ! ¥ f = 1 f = 0
share of entrepreneurs (%) 23.75 25.01 25.19
? rm size total 2.620 2.063 1.531
? credit rationing total 0 0.865 1.952
? prots total 0.569 0.551 0.527
nal Y 0.644 0.606 0.538
goods KF (%) 43.77 49.15 56.67
sector KF 0.484 0.499 0.505
LF 0.811 0.791 0.780
factor w 0.500 0.482 0.435
prices r 0.033 0.025 0.015
w=(r+d) 5.372 5.673 5.825
factor labor 63.00 63.00 63.00
income capital 16.00 14.24 12.35
shares prots 21.00 22.76 24.64
? wealth total 1.107 1.015 0.890
workers 0.895 0.741 0.568
entrepreneurs 1.787 1.836 1.848
? income workers 0.615 0.572 0.496
entrepreneurs 0.736 0.707 0.665
risk premium 0.070 0.073 0.161
wealth total 0.512 0.502 0.578
inequality workers 0.457 0.441 0.555
(Gini) entrepreneurs 0.551 0.476 0.437
(i.e. f = 0). As in the case of uncorrelated shocks the average rm size decreases,
but here this result can partly be traced back to an increase in competition among
monopolists, whose population share in the intermediate goods industry increases,
such that each of them ends up with a smaller market share. In addition, we have
the already mentioned effect that creditconstrained entrepreneurs are forced to
operate at a suboptimally small business size which lets average prots decline ac-
cordingly. This, ceteris paribus, destroys the incentives of becoming an entrepreneur.
A counteracting impulse comes from the nal goods sector whichin the con-
strained economyemploys more capital at diminishing marginal returns, such that
the user costs of capital decline for any given level of individual wealth. This in-
creases the attractivity of entrepreneurship. As before, we observe a redistributive
effect in the functional income distribution, with a prot income share increasing at
the cost of capital incomes.
Table 4 also reveals that aggregate output declines if the tightness of credit con-
straints increases. While capital input rises, labor input in efciency units declines,
21both by (5) having counteracting effects on the demand for the differentiated inter-
mediate goods. There is a larger number of entrepreneurs in the economy, each of
them having a market share in the intermediate goods industry smaller than in a
world without constraints, because it is impossible to lure away capital inputs from
the nal goods production. In the end the aggregate supply of intermediate goods is
smaller too. Substituting capital for labor in the nal goods sector does not compen-
sate for the output loss accompanying the reduction in labor input. Moreover, this
result reects the inefciency arising from the fact the marginal product of capital
in the intermediate goods industry is larger than in the nal goods sector.
Wages as well as average incomes of workers decline too if credit constraints
become more tight. Usually one would expect the equilibrium wage rate to rise as
more agents opt for the entrepreneurial profession. However, the reduction in the
aggregate input of intermediate goods negatively effects the equilibrium wage rate
by (4) and ultimately leads to a decline in average labor incomes. Table 4 shows that
the risk premium on entrepreneurial activityas measured by the average income
differentialgrows if credit constraints become more severe. It more than doubles
as f approaches nil.
Wealth holdings on average decrease if credit constraints become more tight.
This, however, stems from lower wealth holdings of workers, whereas the average
wealth of entrepreneurs increases. Despite this decrease in overall average wealth
holdings, not only the fraction of total capital allocated to the nal goods sector
increases, the level of capital rises too, thereby indirectly indicating the lack of
capital in the intermediate goods industry. The remaining average excess demand
for capital in the intermediate goods sector, as measured by average credit rationing
in Table 4, exceeds the resulting average rm size.
Regarding the wealth distribution, we nd that more tight credit constraints lead
to a more unequal distribution of wealth among the whole population. Interestingly,
wealth becomes more unequally distributed among workers, while wealth inequality
amongentrepreneursdeclines. If we confrontour results with the empirical ndings,
the baseline specication implies a too low degree of wealth inequality. This may be
overcome by assuming a larger variance for the entrepreneurial productivities, i.e.
a larger entrepreneurial risk and is left for future research. However, the general
picture is in accordance with empirical results. The wealth distribution of Figure
2(a) contains mass at high wealth levels and Figure 2.(b) shows that entrepreneurs
are located in the upper tail of the wealth distribution.
Next, we are interested in the mobility between occupations taking place un-
der the stationary distribution. Table 5 presents the quantitative results. As can
be seen, 10:4% of the population change their occupational status from period to
period if credit constraints are practically absent, i.e. f ! ¥ which is a considerably
larger share than in the case of uncorrelated shocks. We nd a pronounced mobil-
ity across occupations in the case of perfect capital markets. This overall mobility
22Table 5: Mobility over occupational states  autocorrelated shocks
Tightness of credit constraints
f ! ¥ f = 1 f = 0
state total change acrit
? total change acrit
? total change acrit
?
qw;1 0.0030 0.0030 a 0.0049 0.0024 0.098 0.0074 0.0021 0.133
qw;2 0.1019 0.0944 0.043 0.1117 0.0791 0.178 0.1280 0.0573 0.224
workers qw;3 0.4171 0.0066 3.740 0.4034 0.0280 1.330 0.3944 0.0508 0.861
qw;4 0.2224 0  0.2125 0  0.2017 0.0 9.079
qw;5 0.0180 0  0.0174 0  0.0166 0 
total 0.7625 0.1040 0.7499 0.1095 0.7481 0.1102
qe;1 0.0024 0.0024 a 0.0025 0.0025 a 0.0025 0.0025 a
qe;2 0.0240 0.0240 a 0.0253 0.0253 a 0.0255 0.0254 a
entre- qe;3 0.0776 0.0776 a 0.0817 0.0817 a 0.0823 0.0823 a
preneurs qe;4 0.1160 0  0.1221 0 0.0622 0.1230 0 0.204
qe;5 0.0176 0  0.0185 0  0.0186 0 0.021
total 0.2375 0.1040 0.2501 0.1095 0.2519 0.1102
? acrit is the level of wealth at which an agent changes his occupational status. a denotes
the minimum level of individual wealth, '' means that a change of the occupational status
never occurs.
even increases in the presence of credit constraints. For the case of f = 0, 11:02%
of the whole population change their occupational status in each period. While this
change in overall mobility might seem small from a quantitative perspective, it is
nevertheless remarkable, since it indicates that credit constraints not only increase
the population share of entrepreneurs but also the uctuation between occupations.
A more detailed look at the mobility patterns shown in Table 5 reveals that gen-
erally workers and entrepreneurs who exhibit a low productivity in their current
profession decide to switch between professions. For f!¥, only few workers are in
the lowest labor productivity state (0:3% of the population) but all of them decide to
take their chances with entrepreneurship in the next period. It is possible to deter-
mine the critical wealth level acrit for each occupational status at which households
are willing to switch between professions. As becomes obvious, the least productive
workers change their occupation regardless of their individual wealth which equals
the lowest possible wealth level a.
If we take a look at workers in the second lowest productivity state, who make up
for 10:19% of the whole population, the majority of this group changes occupations
(which amounts to a population share of 9:44%) and has individual wealth holdings
above the critical level of a = 0:043. The remaining entries into entrepreneurship
are workers from the third productivity state, where we observe a large degree of
persistence in the occupational status. Since workers from this group decide to
23become business owners only if their wealth level is comparably highi.e. amounts
to more than three times the average wealth level of the economythe percentage
number of entries from this class is very small (0:7% of the population), despite the
fact that this class is the largest subgroup with 41:71% of the population. Even more
productive workers never become entrepreneurs in the next period.
With regard to exits from the entrepreneurial class, the mobility patterns are
more simple: All entrepreneurs nding themselves in the lowest three productivity
states (in total 10:4% of the population) change their occupational status regardless
of their individual wealth levels. Analogously, each entrepreneur who nds himself
in the highest two productivity states (in total about 13% of the population) remains
in the intermediate goods sector. Thus, mobility across occupational statuses in our
model is conned to agents who are not successful in their current professions.
This general picture of mobility between occupational classes is unchanged by
the presence of credit constraints. For f = 0, comparably unproductive agents also
decide to change their occupational status. With regard to the exits from entrepren-
eurship we nd again that entrepreneurs from the lowest three productivity states
leave the intermediate goods sector while more productive entrepreneurs from the
two highest classes remain in their profession.9 However, there are differences too.
Most strikingly, the presence of credit constraints generally raises the critical wealth
levels at which workers are willing to become entrepreneurs. Now a larger fraction
of workers from the third productivity state becomes part of the overall entries into
entrepreneurship (5:08% as compared to about 0:7% of the population).
Table 5 also shows how the distribution of workers and entrepreneurs across
productivity states is affected by credit constraints. According to the above described
mobility effects, the distribution of workers across labor productivity states becomes
more concentrated at lower productivity levels, for f = 0. Accordingly, the share of
workers with high labor productivity decreases.10 With respect to entrepreneurs,
the differences in the distribution across productivity states are negligent.
The last aspect to examine is the relationship between credit constraints, indi-
vidual wealth levels, and entrepreneurial activity. Figure 4 shows the likelihood
functions for entrepreneurship for the three cases f ! ¥, f = 1, and f = 0.11 The
graphs display the likelihood (Prob(E)) for an individual with wealth a(i) to be an
9The critical wealth levels for the highly productive entrepreneurs displayed in the table never
becomes effective because for none of these entrepreneurs the wealth holdings will ever fall below
these critical levels.
10The population share of workers in the upper two productivity states decreases from 31:5% to
29:2%.
11The likelihood functions displayed in Figure 4 result from a smoothing procedure. We pooled
wealth levels from the grid in wealth classes and computed averages. The remaining erratic shape of
the likelihood functions should disappear for specications with a larger number of grid points in the
productivity/wealth space.












Figure 4: Likelihood function of entrepreneurship with and without credit
constraints
entrepreneur for any given level of wealth. To certain degree, Figure 4 summarizes
some our previously discussed results from Table 5 above.12
In an economy with credit constraints, agents only choose to become entrepren-
eurs once a higher level of wealth has been acquired. As a result, entrepreneurs are
less frequent among the less wealthy and more frequent among the wealthier house-
holds. The pronounced spikes or kinks in the likelihood functions can be related to
the critical wealth levels, acrit from Table of 5, separating those agents who switch
between occupations from those who remain in their profession for each produc-
tivity class. Because of the discrete number of productivity states and wealth levels
underlying the numerical simulations of our model, the likelihood functions have a
nonmonotonic shape.
A more general result from Figure 4 is that the likelihood of entrepreneurship
increases in individual wealth, regardless of whether or not the individuals are sub-
ject to credit constraints. From the viewpoint of our model it is not possible to infer
from empirical results, stating a signicant effect of individual wealth on entrepren-
eurship, that this can be interpreted as evidence for binding credit constraints.
12For the case of uncorrelated shocks, the likelihood function is a simple stepfunction assigning
zero probability for entrepreneurship to all agents below the critical wealth level; see also Figure
2(b).
255 Concluding Remarks
This paper shows that the interdependence of markets in a dynamic stochastic gen-
eral equilibrium model and the dynamic properties of the underlying idiosyncratic
shocks play an important role in the explanation of the macroeconomic effects of
imperfect capital markets in form of nancial constraints on the allocation of input
factors over sectors, entrepreneurial risktaking, betweengroup mobility, wealth
accumulation, and inequality.
The stationary wealth distribution generated in the model is consistent with
empiricalndings. Entrepreneurialhouseholds own a substantial share of household
wealth and this share increases throughout the wealth distribution.
We derive ambiguous effects on equilibrium occupational choice and average
prot incomes for an increase in the tightness of credit constraints, the results cru-
cially depending on the dynamic properties of the idiosyncratic risks. The same
is true for our ndings regarding betweengroup mobility which differ strikingly
between the two settings. This indicates that the degree of persistence of idiosyn-
cratic shocks gives rise to interesting incentives for individual occupational choice
and household accumulation behavior. Regarding exit and entry rates into entre-
preneurship, we nd that higher persistence of shocks generally increases between
group mobility. Uncorrelated shocks in tendency generate a too low level of mobil-
ity, whereas serially correlated shocks lead to mobility too large to match empirical
evidence.
There are many important issues this paper does not address. The model
lacks a fully microfounded formulation of credit constraints in terms of incentive
compatibility constraints and a more detailed modeling of nancial intermediation.
By simply stating the changes in the Gini coefcient, our results on inequality are
still highly aggregated and should be decomposed in order to nd out how good our
calibration results on wealth concentration match the distributional data.
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A Computational Issues and Transition Probabilities
The state space of wealth is approximated by a grid of N wealth levels an for n=1; ;N with
a1 =a and aN = ¯ k. The macroeconomic equilibrium is recursively computed. We start with a
initial guess on factor prices  w;  r, and the equilibrium level of employment in efciency units
 L. Let µ =

 w;  r;  L
	
denote the vector of the initial guesses. We obtain factor proportions
in the nal goods sector from this rst solution trial. The underlying production technology
implies  KF =  L  w
 r+d
g








28Let k(an;s(j)e) denote the rm size of an entrepreneur with productivity s(j)e and wealth
an is able to operate at for a given degree of borrowing constraints. His prot is given by









Let aw(an; s(j)wjµ) and xw(an; s(j)wjµ) as well as ae(an; s(j)ejµ) and xe(an; s(j)ejµ) de-
note the policy functions associated with the optimization problems (10) and (11) for the
given initial guess on prices and employment. We characterize agents by their wealth hold-
ings an, their occupational status z, where z=1 denotes a worker and z=2 an entrepreneur,
and their current productivity state s(j)h, h = e;w.
Knowing the policy functions and transition matrices for the underlying productivity
shocks, we are able to compute the probability for an agent to have wealth an, occupational
status z and productivity state s(j). Let yn;z;s(µ) denote the respective probability for n =
1;:::;N, z = 1;2 and s(j)h = qh;j, j = 1;:::;m, h = e;w.
The probabilities yn;z;s(  w;  r;  L) can be used to compute aggregate quantities. The aggre-








































The supply of capital to the nal goods sector is given by KS
F(µ)=K(µ) KD
I (µ). Employment














The initial solution guess only represents an equilibrium if the following conditions must
hold:
Labor supply in efciency units must equal the initial guess  L
L(µ) =  L (i)












The algorithm for nding the equilibrium values consists of three nested loops over  L,  w and
 r. The rst loop iteratively computes the value  L which meets condition (i) for given factor
prices  w and  r. Then, factor prices  w and  r are adjusted according to the resulting excess
demands for labor and capital according to conditions (ii) and (iii). The whole procedure is
repeated until the equilibrium conditions (i) to (iii) are satised, except or a tolerably small
approximation error.
To implement the algorithm, we used the programming language C++. The underlying
source code is available from the authors upon request.
30Table A.1: Transition probabilities of the Markov processes






0:01222 0:21440 0:54676 0:21440 0:01222
0:01222 0:21440 0:54676 0:21440 0:01222
0:01222 0:21440 0:54676 0:21440 0:01222
0:01222 0:21440 0:54676 0:21440 0:01222













0:28689 0:61844 0:09396 0:00072 0:00000
0:04575 0:52861 0:40605 0:01954 0:00001
0:00246 0:17179 0:65150 0:17179 0:00246
0:00001 0:01954 0:40605 0:52861 0:04575












0:02309 0:23025 0:49331 0:23025 0:02309
0:02309 0:23025 0:49331 0:23025 0:02309
0:02309 0:23025 0:49331 0:23025 0:02309
0:02309 0:23025 0:49331 0:23025 0:02309












0:59871 0:39831 0:00298 0:00000 0:00000
0:04006 0:73331 0:22605 0:00058 0:00000
0:00008 0:10556 0:78870 0:10556 0:00008
0:00000 0:00058 0:22605 0:73331 0:04006












0:01604 0:22153 0:52487 0:22153 0:01604
0:01604 0:22153 0:52487 0:22153 0:01604
0:01604 0:22153 0:52487 0:22153 0:01604
0:01604 0:22153 0:52487 0:22153 0:01604






(b) Transition probabilities  autocorrelated shocks
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